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T o avoid inventory risks, manufacturers often place rush orders with suppliers only after they receive firm orders fromtheir customers (retailers). Rush orders are costly to both parties because the supplier incurs higher production costs.
We consider a situation where the supplier’s production cost is reduced if the manufacturer can place some of its order
in advance. In addition to the rush order contract with a pre-established price, we examine whether the supplier should
offer advance-order discounts to encourage the manufacturer to place a portion of its order in advance, even though
the manufacturer incurs some inventory risk. While the advance-order discount contract is Pareto-improving, our analy-
sis shows that the discount contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. However, if the supplier imposes a pre-speci-
fied minimum order quantity requirement as a qualifier for the manufacturer to receive the advance-order discount,
then such a combined contract can coordinate the supply chain. Furthermore, the combined contract enables the supplier
to attain the first-best solution. We also explore a delegation contract that either party could propose. Under this contract,
the manufacturer delegates the ordering and salvaging activities to the supplier in return for a discounted price on
all units procured. We find the delegation contract coordinates the supply chain and is Pareto-improving. We extend
our analysis to a setting where the suppliers capacity is limited for advance production but unlimited for rush orders.
Our structural results obtained for the one-supplier-one-manufacturer case continue to hold when we have two
manufacturers.
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1. Introduction
Grocery retailers often sell private labels of holiday cel-
ebration products (e.g., moon cakes, pumpkin pies,
etc.) with a single selling season. Well before the sell-
ing season starts, the grocer’s food technology team,
the supply chain department, and the marketing
department work together to develop recipes, design
packaging, and select contract food manufacturers.
After completing the selection, the retailer will place a
firm order to the contract food manufacturer, who
will in turn, place a firm order to its packaging
material supplier. Because the food product is perish-
able and the packaging is specifically customized to
the retailer, neither the manufacturer nor the supplier
will produce the corresponding items in advance.
Consequently, all orders along the supply chain are
rush orders that are costly to fill.
The above business context motivates us to con-
sider a situation when both the manufacturer and the
supplier have to deal with rush orders of highly cus-
tomized products. Due to the high production cost for
rush orders, the supplier charges the manufacturer a
high pre-established contract price. Though the sup-
plier’s production costs could be substantially low-
ered if the orders are placed in advance, the
manufacturer refrains from doing so given its appre-
hension of overstocking the customized material.1
Hence, a discounted wholesale price that a supplier
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may offer, could encourage the manufacturer to place
an advance-order.2
Based on our work with a grocery retailer in the
UK, we learned that food contract manufacturers and
packaging material suppliers are aware of the trade-off
between the benefits of advance-order discounts and
the (imputed) costs of the leftover packagingmaterials.
This trade-off motivated us to examine the following
research questions for the case when the original rush
order contract price is already established:
1. Should the supplier offer advance-order dis-
counts?
2. Can the advance-order discount contract coor-
dinate a decentralized supply chain? If not,
how about a variant that combines the
advance-order discount contract with other
commonly observed terms such as minimum
order quantity and/or inventory management
delegation?
We use a two-echelon supply chain model in a
two-period setting to explore the above research
questions. We first show that a simple discount con-
tract does not coordinate the supply chain. Then, we
explore a variant of the contract that combines the
advance-order discounts with a pre-specified mini-
mum advance-order quantity. The combined contract
enables the supplier to coordinate the supply chain.
Under this combined contract, the supplier extracts
the entire surplus of the manufacturer, while offering
the manufacturer a discounted wholesale price. This
finding provides a good rationale (in addition to the
economies of batch production processes) for the
omnipresent industry practice of minimum order
quantities.3
Besides minimum order quantities, we consider
the case wherein the manufacturer (or the supplier)
proposes that the ordering decisions and the sal-
vaging activities are delegated to the supplier in
exchange for a new discounted price for all the units
procured by the manufacturer.4 Such a contract is
akin to the vendor managed inventory (VMI) setup
in supply chains. We demonstrate that when price
discount is coupled with delegation, this combined
contract not only coordinates the supply chain but is
also Pareto-improving under mild conditions on the
demand process.
Our analysis generates the following three key
insights:
1. Though advance-purchase discount contracts
by themselves do not coordinate a supply
chain, they do coordinate the supply chain
when coupled with either (a) a minimum-
order quantity requirement, or (b) an inven-
tory management delegation contract.
2. Combining advance-purchase discount and
minimum-order-quantity can always coordi-
nate a supply chain.
3. There exists a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion for the existence of an advance-purchase
discount and inventory management delega-
tion contract that coordinates the supply chain.
To our knowledge, the existing literature does not
examine the role of minimum order quantities and
inventory management delegations in combination
with advance-purchase discounts. The insights we
draw provide additional reasons for suppliers to offer
minimum order quantity contracts and VMI-like ser-
vices in decentralized supply chains. In this study, we
first prove our results for the case of a one-supplier-
one-manufacturer supply chain. Then, we discuss
how our model can be extended to the case of two
manufacturers.
Our study is organized as follows. A brief literature
survey is given in section 2. Section 3 presents our
supply chain model with uncertain demand and
establishes two benchmarks. In section 4, we show
that the advance-order discount contract cannot coor-
dinate the supply chain. Section 5 reveals that a com-
bination of the advance-order discount contract and a
minimum order quantity can coordinate the supply
chain. Section 6 considers the situation when the man-
ufacturer delegates the responsibility of managing the
inventory decisions to the supplier in exchange for a
discounted wholesale price. Section 7 extends our
analysis to the case of a one-supplier-two-manufac-
turers supply chain. Section 8 concludes and proofs
are provided in Appendix S1.
2. Literature Review
As one of the first articles that examine minimum
order quantity contracts, Chow et al. (2012) consider
a minimum order quantity contract in a quick
response context where the manufacturer can postpone
its single-order decision until he obtains updated
demand information.5 They find that if the supplier
can postpone the specification of the minimum order
quantity till some information about demand is
observed, then such an MOQ contract can coordinate
the supply chain. In general, a manufacturer may be
reluctant to participate in such a contract when the
supplier cannot commit to the contractual terms (i.e.,
the minimum order quantity) in advance. In this
study, we show that, by combining the advance-
order discounts with minimum order quantity con-
tract, the supplier can simultaneously commit to the
contractual terms in advance and coordinate the
supply chain.
Our model differs from Chow et al. (2012) in three
important aspects. First, Chow et al. (2012) consider a
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setting in which the manufacturer orders exactly once
(one decision), while we consider a different setting in
which the manufacturer can place two sequential orders
(i.e., two decisions): (a) an advance-order that is sub-
ject to a minimum order quantity, and (b) a top-up
order after the demand is realized. Second, we con-
sider a situation when the discount factor for the
advance order is endogenously determined by the sup-
plier, while Chow et al. (2012) assume this factor is
exogenously given. Third, our analysis is based on a
general demand distribution that possesses Increasing
Generalized Failure Rate (IGFR) properties, while
Chow et al. (2012) assume that the demand is nor-
mally distributed (which is a special case of the IGFR
distributions).
Our research is also related to the advance purchas-
ing literature (e.g., Tang et al. 2004, Xie and Shugan
2001, etc.). In the field of advance-order discounts
arising from supply chain management, our base
model that deals with advance order discount is clo-
sely related to Cachon (2004) and €Ozer et al. (2007).
Cachon (2004) shows that advance-purchase dis-
counts can coordinate a manufacturer-retailer supply
chain when the manufacturer can set both the
advance-purchase discount and the regular wholesale
price. Our base model contrasts with Cachon (2004) in
two respects. First, in the initial model presented in
Cachon (2004), the manufacturer’s production cost is
the same for both advance and regular purchase and
there is only one production opportunity. Later, as an
extension, Cachon (2004) incorporates a positive ship-
ping cost for rush orders. The shipping cost is
incurred by the supplier and hence this cost can even-
tually be treated as an increase in the supplier’s unit
production cost for rush orders. Even in our setting,
the supplier’s production cost is lower for advance-
orders, and higher for rush-orders. However, our set-
ting accounts for additional flexibility in production
because we consider the supplier to have two produc-
tion opportunities—one for advance-orders and one
for rush-orders—facilitating more informed produc-
tion decisions. While our preliminary analysis of the
Pareto improving nature of advance-order contract
concurs with the findings of Cachon (2004), our main
contribution lies in modifying the traditional
advance-order discount contract to ensure supply
chain coordination in a Pareto improving manner.
Second, while Cachon (2004) assumes that the manu-
facturer can set the purchase price for both advance
and regular orders, our base model can be viewed as
a special case when the rush-order price has been
established in advance, and the supplier can only
offer an advance-order discount on the rush-order
price.
€Ozer et al. (2007) examine the optimal ordering pol-
icy with demand forecast updating when the supplier
can set its price before and after the manufacturer
updates its demand forecast. They determine the con-
ditions under which the supplier should offer
advance-order discount. That is, when the price in the
first period should be strictly less than the price in the
second period. They also show that the optimal con-
tract is Pareto-improving. Our context is different
from that considered by €Ozer et al. (2007) in two
ways. First, while €Ozer et al. (2007) consider a generic
setting in which the demand forecast is updated after
one period, our base model can be viewed as a special
case of their model by assuming that the demand is
realized after one period. Second, in addition to the
Pareto-improvement shown by €Ozer et al. (2007) our
base model analysis shows that the advance-order
discount contract cannot coordinate the decentralized
supply chain. More importantly we show that, by
combining advance-order discount with a minimum
order quantity, or with inventory management dele-
gation, the two combined contracts can coordinate the
supply chain in a Pareto improving way.
Thus, although our advance-order discount base
model is directly related to Cachon (2004) and €Ozer
et al. (2007), we leverage our base model analysis to
examine two new combined contracts that occur in
practice but have not been examined in the literature
hitherto. In particular, while it is known that advance-
order discount contract cannot coordinate the decen-
tralized supply chain (€Ozer et al. 2007), we show that
the supplier can coordinate the supply chain and
achieve the first-best solution if it combines advance-
order discount with either minimum advance-order
quantities or by delegating inventory management
decisions to the manufacturer.
To our knowledge, this is the first study to investi-
gate the impact of (i) the combination of advance
order discounts and the minimum-order-quantity
contract, and (ii) the combination of advance order
discounts and inventory management delegation con-
tract, on supply chain coordination.
3. The Model
Consider a two-level supply chain comprising of a
supplier and a manufacturer. The manufacturer sells
its product to retailers at the wholesale price p. While
p is set beforehand, the underlying product demand
D, from all the retailers over a single selling season is
uncertain. We assume that D follows a probability
distribution F() with density function f() that satisfies
the IGFR property (i.e., xfðxÞ1 FðxÞ is increasing in x).
6
To avoid obsolescence, the manufacturer places
rush orders with the supplier only after receiving firm
orders from the retailers. On the other hand, without
a quantity commitment from the manufacturer, the
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supplier is reluctant to produce in advance, especially
when the product is specifically customized for the
retailers. Hence, the supplier has to expedite its pro-
duction process in order to deliver the (rush) order on
time. As a result of the expedited production process,
the supplier incurs an inflated unit production cost,
which we denote by e. Let r denote the regular
contract price that the supplier quotes to the manufac-
turer. We assume p ≥ r > e. Therefore, for any exoge-
nous regular price r established in advance, the
ex ante expected profits for the manufacturer and the
supplier for a rush order, which we denote byPom and
Pos respectively, are given by:
7
Pom ¼ ðp rÞEðDÞ; ð1Þ
and
Pos ¼ ðr eÞEðDÞ: ð2Þ
Also, the ex ante expected total supply chain profit8
is Πo = (pe)E(D).
3.1. The Advance-Order Discount
Consider the case when the food retailer has speci-
fied the recipe, selected the manufacturer, and app-
roved the packaging design in period 0. The price r
remains the same for the rush-order when the manu-
facturer delays its order until a firm order is received
from the retailer at the beginning of the second period.
However, the supplier realizes that it can lower its unit
production cost from e to c if it can begin the produc-
tion in period 1 and deliver the order in period 2. The
supplier has to decide if it has to offer a discounted
price of dr (where d is a decision variable in (0, 1)) in
order to encourage the manufacturer to place an
advance-order in the first period that will eventually be
delivered at the beginning of the selling season.9 That
is, both the advance-order (placed at the beginning of
period 1) and the rush-order (placed at the beginning
of period 2) will be delivered before the end of the sec-
ond period.
Figure 1 depicts the setting of the advance-order
discount contract, which includes the rush-order case
(i.e., without discount when d = 1) as a special case.
For exposition, we shall assume that d 2 ðcr ; 1Þ so that
the supplier will not offer the advance-ordering dis-
count at a loss (i.e., dr ≥ c).10
Under the advance-order discount contract, the
supplier offers an advance-order price of dr per unit
and the manufacturer must place an advance-order of
x (>0) in the first period before the demand D is real-
ized, in order to avail the discounted price. Later on,
once the demand D is realized, the manufacturer
orders-up-to quantity y (≥x) in the second period. Thus,
the effective order quantity in the second period (i.e.,
the top-up order quantity) is [y  x]+. If y > d, the
manufacturer salvages the over-stocked [y  d]+
units for a unit salvage price s. We assume that s ≥ 0
and that s is net of any costs involved in salvaging the
overstocked units.
We model the strategic interaction between the sup-
plier and the manufacturer as a two-period Stackel-
berg game in which the supplier acts as the leader11
who sets the advance-order discount d and the manu-
facturer acts as the follower who chooses the order
quantities x and y. We use backward induction to
determine the optimal advance-order quantity x and
the optimal order-up-to quantity y for a fixed dis-
count d. Then, we examine the optimal discount con-
tract under different settings.
3.2. First-Best Solution: The Centralized Case
Before we analyze the decentralized supply chain for
the case when the supplier offers an advance-order
reliateRrerutcafunaMreilppuS
Period 2
Period 1
Produces at cost of e
with zero lead time
Produces at cost of c
with unit lead time
Sells at r
Sells at r
Orders-up-to y
Orders x
Realized demand, d
Uncertain demand, D
Sells at p
Salvages at s
e
miT
Material flow
Information flow
Period 0 Sourcespackaging
Specifies recipe and
packaging design
Places quantity order
Figure 1 Schematic of Our Advance-Order Setting
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discount contract d, we first establish a benchmark in
a centralized system in which the supplier and the
manufacturer operate under a central planner. Given
the advance-order x placed in period 1 and a realiza-
tion d of the demand, the central planner determines its
order-up-to level y by solving the following problem
at the beginning of the second period:12
Pc2ðx; dÞ ¼ maxyx fp minfd;yg  e½y  x
þ þ s½y  dþg,
where the addends in the objective function denote
the sales revenue, the production cost in period 2,
and the salvage value, in that order. It is easy to
see that the optimal order-up-to level is y* = max
{x, d}. Hence, Pc2ðx; dÞ can be simplified to
Pc2ðx; dÞ ¼ pd  e½d  xþ þ s½x  dþ.
Thus, the expected profit of the central planner in
the first period can be written as follows:
Pc1 ¼ max
x0
fcx þ EðPc2ðx;DÞÞg ¼ max
x0
fðp  cÞEðDÞ
ðe  cÞ E½D  xþ  ðc  sÞE½x  Dþg.
Observe that Pc1 resembles the expected profit
function of a newsvendor problem with (e  c) as
the unit shortage cost and (c  s) as the unit over-
ordering cost. From the first-order condition, the
optimal initial order quantity x* is given by:
xc ¼ F1
e c
e s
 
; ð3Þ
where F1() is the inverse of the probability distri-
bution of the demand D. By substituting xc into P
c
1,
the first-best supply chain profit can be obtained as
follows:
Pc ¼ ðp cÞEðDÞ ðe cÞE½D xc þ  ðc sÞE½xc Dþ
¼cxc þ pEðDÞ eE½D xc þ þ sE½xc Dþ:
ð4Þ
Observe that it is always feasible for the central
planner to set x = 0 and y = d so that the supply chain
profit is equal to Πo  (p  e)E(D), which is the profit
in the base case. Hence, when the central planner opti-
mizes its profit jointly over x and y, the optimal sup-
ply chain profit is at least as much as that in the base
case, that is, Πc ≥ Πo.
4. Optimal Advance Order Discount
Contract: The Decentralized Case
We now examine the advance-order discount contract
in a decentralized system. Consider a decentralized
system in which the supplier determines the discount
(d), and the manufacturer chooses its advance-order
quantity (x) and its order-up-to quantity (y). For a
given advance-order x and a realized demand d, the
manufacturer needs to determine the order-up-to
quantity y during the second period by solving the
following problem:13
Pd2ðx; dÞ ¼ maxy x fpminfd; yg  r½y x
þ þ s½y dþg;
where r is the regular unit procurement cost and s
is the unit salvage value (refer to Figure 1). It is easy
to verify that the optimal order-up-to quantity for
any given x is y* = max{x, d}. Hence, Pd2ðx; dÞ
reduces to:
Pd2ðx; dÞ ¼ pd r½d xþ þ s½x dþ:
Using the above optimal profit Pd2ðx; dÞ in the sec-
ond period, the manufacturer needs to determine its
optimal first period order quantity x, ordered at the
discounted unit price dr, by solving the following
problem:
Pd1ðdÞ ¼ max
x 0
fdrxþ E Pd2ðx;DÞ
 g
¼ max
x 0
fðp drÞEðDÞ  rð1 dÞE½D xþ
 ðdr sÞE½xDþg:
ð5Þ
The first-order condition reveals the optimal initial
order quantity is:
xd ¼ F1
ð1 dÞr
r s
 
: ð6Þ
On substituting xd into the objective function, the
manufacturer’s profit associated with a given dis-
count d is obtained:
Pd1ðdÞ ¼ ðp drÞEðDÞ  rð1 dÞE½D xdþ
 ðdr sÞE½xd Dþ:
ð7Þ
Similarly, by noting that y ¼ maxfxd; dg, we obtain
the supplier’s expected profit, for any given d, as:
Pds ðdÞ ¼ ðdr cÞxd þ ðr eÞE½y  xdþ
¼ ðdr cÞxd þ ðr eÞE½D xdþ; ð8Þ
where (dr  c) and (r  e) represent the supplier’s
profit margins in periods 1 and 2, respectively.
4.1. Over-Production by the Supplier in the First
Period
It is plausible that, by taking advantage of the lower
production cost c in the first period, the supplier may
be willing to risk over-producing in the first period
(i.e., produce z units in the first period, where z is lar-
ger than the advance-order quantity xd placed by the
manufacturer during the first period).14 When the
supplier over-produces, the supplier’s profit given in
Equation (8) can be modified as follows:
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Pds ðz; dÞ ¼ drxd  czþ rE½y  xdþ
 eE ½D xdþ  ðz xdÞ
 þ
; ð9Þ
where the supplier makes two decisions: (a) zð xdÞ,
the supplier’s production quantity during the first
period, and (b) d, the discount offered for the
advance-orders.
However, in many practical instances, such an
over-production strategy is seldom employed by a
supplier for the following reasons. First, suppliers
have finite production and inventory holding capaci-
ties and they transact with multiple manufacturers
(in addition to the one we capture in our model). As
such, suppliers would prefer to use the capacity to
produce for other manufacturers with firm orders
rather than taking the risk to over-produce. Second,
besides the underlying risk of over-production, that
is, the supplier ends up with certain unwanted units
with virtually zero salvage value (as they are cus-
tomized products), the opportunity cost incurred by
the supplier who uses its capacity to over-produce
(i.e., produce more than the advance-order placed by
a manufacturer) is high compared to the benefits that
it gains from such an overproduction strategy. Nev-
ertheless, for the sake of completion, we analyze the
case when the supplier over-produces during the
first period in Appendix S2. We show that, even with
over-production by the supplier in the first period,
an advance-order discount contract cannot coordi-
nate the supply chain.
In the remaining portion of this study, for the ease
of exposition and for tractability, we shall focus on
the scenario when the supplier produces the exact
quantity ordered by the manufacturer during the first
period.
4.2. Optimal Advance-Order Discount Contract
By considering the profit functions given in Equations
(7) and (8), along with the manufacturer’s participa-
tion constraint, the supplier’s problem can be formu-
lated as:
max
d2½0;1
Pds ðdÞ ¼ max
d2½0;1
ðdr cÞxd þ ðr eÞE½D xdþ
subject to Pd1ðdÞPom  ðp rÞEðDÞ; ð10Þ
where xd is given in Equation (6). The following
proposition characterizes the supplier’s optimal dis-
count d^ that solves the supplier’s problem given in
Equation (10).
PROPOSITION 1. Let d  1  ðr sr Þðe ce sÞ (note that
d [ cr). In a decentralized system, the supplier’s optimal
discount d^ possesses the following properties:
1. The optimal discount d^ 2 ðd; 1Þ.
2. The supplier’s profit function Pds ðdÞ is unimodal in
d in the interval [d*, 1] so that the optimal
discount d^ is the unique solution of the first-order
condition dP
d
s
dd ¼ 0. Furthermore, for the case when
D  N(l, r2), the supplier’s optimal discount d^
is decreasing in r.
3. The optimal discount contract d^ is Pareto-
improving. That is, both the supplier and the
manufacturer can obtain a higher profit than the
base case (i.e., Pds ðd^Þ  Pos  ðr  eÞEðDÞ and
Pd1ðd^Þ  Pom  ðp  rÞEðDÞ).
Proposition 1 has the following implications.15
The first statement shows that d^\ 1 so that it is
beneficial for the supplier to offer a strictly positive
advance-order discount. Also, observe that d^r [ c,
which indicates that it is not required for the sup-
plier to offer such a deep discount that it incurs a
loss in the first period. The second statement of the
proposition implies that when demand becomes
more uncertain, it is optimal for the supplier to
offer a larger discount. The third statement of
Proposition 2 resembles a more general result stated
in theorem 7 of €Ozer et al. (2007). It illustrates that
the optimal discount contract d^ is Pareto-improving;
that is, both the supplier and the manufacturer can
obtain higher profits relative to the base case associ-
ated with rush orders.
However, it remains to determine if the advance-
order discount contract can coordinate the supply
chain. To address this issue, observe from Equations
(7) and (8) that the decentralized supply chain profit
can be written as:
PdðdÞ ¼ Pds ðdÞ þPd1ðdÞ
¼ cxd þ pEðDÞ  eE½D xdþ þ sE½xd Dþ;
ð11Þ
where xd is given in Equation (6). By comparing
Equations (11) and (4), and by setting xd ¼ xc , it is
easy to check that a discount contract that has
d ¼ d  1  ðr sr Þðe ce sÞ can coordinate a decentral-
ized supply chain. However, from the first statement
of Proposition 2, we can conclude that the supplier
will never set d^ ¼ d. In the following proposition,
we claim that the supplier optimal discount contract
can never coordinate the supply chain.
PROPOSITION 2. In a decentralized system, the optimal
advance-order discount contract d^ can never coordinate
the supply chain. Specifically, the supplier’s optimal dis-
count factor d^ [ d.
Though Proposition 2 shows that the optimal dis-
count contract d^ alone can never coordinate the sup-
ply chain, the coordination will be possible if the
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supplier makes a transfer payment of S ¼ Pd1ðdÞ
Pom to the manufacturer. When such a payment is
made, the manufacturer is no worse off than the base
case and the supplier achieves the highest possible
profit because,
SþPom þPds ðdÞ ¼ Pd1ðdÞ þPds ðdÞ ¼ Pc:
Even though the supplier can combine the optimal
discount contract d^ with a transfer payment to coor-
dinate the supply chain, such mechanism requires a
change to the pre-existing pricing structure. This
gives rise to the following question: Without chang-
ing the existing price structure by introducing a transfer
payment as discussed above, can the supplier leverage the
advance-order discount contract to coordinate the supply
chain and extract the entire surplus from the manufac-
turer? If such a mechanism exists, it is the optimal
contract among all possible contracts because it
enables the supplier to attain the highest possible
profit in a decentralized system. The next section
examines such a contract.
5. Advance-Order Discount Contract
with a Minimum Order Quantity
Consider the scenario in which the supplier imposes a
minimum advance-order quantity q as a qualifier for
the manufacturer to receive a discount d. That is, in
order to benefit from a discounted advance-order, the
manufacturer has to order at least q units in the
advance-order. We shall refer to such a contract as a
combined contract because it combines an advance-
order discount with a minimum advance-order quan-
tity. For the combined contract (d, q) that the supplier
quotes, it is easy to check that the manufacturer’s
optimal order-up-to quantity remains the same,
y* = max{x, d}, as described in section 3.2. It also fol-
lows from Equation (5), and the fact that the manufac-
turer will receive the discount d only when its
advance-order quantity x is as much as q, the manu-
facturer’s problem in the first period can be formu-
lated as:16
Pq1ðd;qÞ¼maxxq fðpdrÞEðDÞ rð1dÞE½Dx
þ
ðdr sÞE½xDþg
¼max
xq
fpEðDÞ rE½Dxþ þ sE½xDþ drxg:
ð12Þ
By considering the first-order condition along
with the constraint x ≥ q, and noting that the objec-
tive function is strictly unimodal in x, it is easy to
show that the optimal initial order quantity is as
follows:
xqðd; qÞ ¼ max F1
ð1 dÞr
r s
 
; q
 	
: ð13Þ
By incorporating the manufacturer’s best response
function xqðd; qÞ in Equation (8) we can write the sup-
plier’s profit function as:
Pqsðd; qÞ ¼ ðdr cÞxqðd; qÞ þ ðr eÞE½D xqðd; qÞþ;
ð14Þ
and formulate the supplier’s optimization problem
as follows:
max
q 0
max
d2½0;1
fðdr cÞxqðd; qÞ þ ðr eÞE½D xqðd; qÞþg
subject to xqðd; qÞ ¼ maxfF1
ð1 dÞr
r s
 
; qg; and
pEðDÞ  rE½D xqðd; qÞþ þ sE½xqðd; qÞ Dþ
 drxqðd; qÞ ðp rÞEðDÞ:
ð15Þ
By analyzing the supplier’s problem (15) for the
case when xqðd; qÞ ¼ F1ðð1 dÞrr s Þ and for the case
when xqðd; qÞ ¼ q individually, and by comparing
the supplier’s optimal profit associated with these
two cases, we obtain Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3. The optimal combined contract ð~d; ~qÞ is
given by
~d ¼ r½EðDÞ  E½D ~q
þ þ sE½~qDþ
r~q
; ð16Þ
and
~q ¼ F1 e c
e s
 
: ð17Þ
Also, the optimal combined contract ð~d; ~qÞ has the follow-
ing properties:
1. Relative to the coordinated discount contract d*, it
offers a smaller discount (i.e., 1 [ ~d [ d [ cr).
2. It induces the manufacturer to set its initial order
quantity as in the centralized case (i.e.,
xqðd; qÞ ¼ ~q ¼ xc ).
3. It enables the supplier to extract the entire surplus
from the manufacturer (i.e., Pq1ð~d; ~qÞ ¼ Pom).
4. It coordinates the supply chain (i.e., Pqsð~d; ~qÞþ
Pq1ð~d; ~qÞ ¼ Pc).
We draw the following insights from Proposition 3.
The first two statements of the proposition quantify
the optimal combined contract ð~d; ~qÞ. Statements three
and four imply that the optimal combined contract
ð~d; ~qÞ can both coordinate the supply chain and enable
the supplier to extract the entire surplus from the
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manufacturer. Hence, the supplier achieves its high-
est possible profit under the optimal combined con-
tract. Under the optimal contract the manufacturer is
made to order ~q ¼ xc in the advance order. Further, it
enables the supplier to gain a higher profit as
ð~dr  cÞ  ðdr  cÞ. In summary, Proposition 3
demonstrates the superior performance of the com-
bined contract that involves minimum order quanti-
ties. The proposition offers a plausible explanation to
why the minimum-order-quantity contracts are
widely observed in practice; the contract enables the
supplier to attain the first-best solution (i.e., the high-
est profit) by coordinating the supply chain.
Proposition 3 shows that the optimal combined con-
tract ð~d; ~qÞ can coordinate the decentralized supply
chain when the demand follows a general IGFR proba-
bility distribution. To examine the impact of demand
uncertainty on the optimal combined contract ð~d; ~qÞ
further, we consider the case when the demand is nor-
mally distributed, which is a member of IGFR distribu-
tions. By using the properties of the standard normal
distribution, we establish the following corollary:
COROLLARY 1. When D  N(l, r2), the optimal
combined contract ð~d; ~qÞ given in Equations (16) and
(17) can be simplified to the following:
~d ¼ 1 ðr sÞ½/ðkÞ þ kUðkÞr
rðlþ krÞ ð18Þ
and
~q ¼lþ kr; where
k ¼U1 e c
e s
 
:
ð19Þ
Both the optimal discount ~d and the optimal minimum
order quantity ~q are increasing in l. Furthermore,
1. If e > 2c  s (i.e., when k > 0), then the optimal
minimum order quantity ~q is linearly increasing
in r and the optimal discount ~d is decreasing and
convex in r.
2. If e = 2c  s (i.e., when k = 0), then the optimal
minimum order quantity ~q is independent of r
and the optimal discount ~d decreases linearly in r.
3. If e < 2c  s (i.e., when k < 0), then the optimal
minimum order quantity ~q is linearly decreasing in r.
Also, the optimal discount ~d is decreasing and concave
in r if /ðU1ðe ce sÞÞ þ ðe ce sÞ U1ðe ce sÞ [ 0.
Corollary 1 has the following implications. First, as
the mean demand increases, it is always beneficial for
the supplier to set a higher minimum order quantity
(i.e., increase ~q) and to discount less (i.e., increase ~d).
Second, when r increases, it is optimal to set a higher
minimum order quantity ~q (see, Equation (19)) and to
discount more (i.e., to set ~d smaller) if the expedited
production cost is sufficiently high (i.e., e > 2c  s).
We can interpret the other statements in the same
manner and so omit the details.
6. Discount Contracts with Delegations
In Proposition 3, we argued that the combined con-
tract (that combines the advance-order discount and
the minimum order quantity initiated by the supplier)
can enable the supplier to achieve the first-best solu-
tion by coordinating the supply chain. By noting that
the aforementioned combined contract is initiated by
the supplier, we want to verify if there is a similar
contract, that when initiated by the manufacturer, can
coordinate the supply chain. In this section, we anal-
yse such a contract.
Consider a contract in which the manufacturer can
delegate its inventory decisions (i.e., order placement
and salvage decisions) to the supplier, who can lower
its unit production cost from e to c when the produc-
tion is undertaken early. We term this contract as the
delegation contract. In exchange for this delegation con-
tract, the manufacturer requires that the supplier
should satisfy the realized demand (by using either
the advance production in period 1 or the expedited
production in period 2) and offer a discounted price
hr, where h < 1, on all the units. Now, it is not clear if
the supplier should accept such a delegation contract
offered by the manufacturer.17
6.1. Supplier’s Problem under the Delegation
Contract
In the event that the supplier rejects the delegation
contract offered by the manufacturer, the manufac-
turer’s expected profit is Pom ¼ ðp  rÞEðDÞ and the
supplier’s expected profit is Pos ¼ ðr  eÞEðDÞ, see
Equations (1) and (2). On the other hand, should the
supplier accept the delegation contract, then the man-
ufacturer is passive (because the manufacturer dele-
gates all the ordering decisions and the salvage
operations to the supplier). In such a case, the manu-
facturer’s expected profit becomes PgmðhÞ ¼
ðp  hrÞEðDÞ, with hr as the discounted purchase
price.18 Clearly, the manufacturer is better off under
the delegation contract because h < 1. It remains to
check if the supplier is not worse off so that it may
participate in the delegation contract.
Under the delegation contract, the supplier (and
not the manufacturer) has to determine its advance
production quantity x in the first period, and its pro-
duce-up-to level y in the second period. Additionally,
the supplier should also account for the salvage
operations after the selling season. For a given
advance-production quantity x in the first period and
a realization d of the demand, the supplier determines
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its produce-up-to level y by solving the following
problem:
Pgs;2ðx; d; hÞ ¼ maxy x fhrd e½y x
þ þ s½y dþg;
where the addends in the right-hand side denote
the revenue from the manufacturer based on the
realized demand d, the expedited production cost in
the second period, and the salvage income, in that
order. It is easy to see that the optimal produce-up-
to quantity is y* = max{x, d}, and so Pgs;2ðx; d; hÞ
can be simplified as:
Pgs;2ðx; d; hÞ ¼ hrd e½d xþ þ s½x dþ: ð20Þ
Using a dynamic program the supplier’s problem in
the first period can be formulated:
Pgs;1ðhÞ ¼ max
x 0
fcxþ E Pgs;2ðx;D; hÞ
h i
g
¼ max
x 0
fðhr cÞEðDÞ  ðe cÞE½D xþ
 ðc sÞE½xDþg:
ð21Þ
From the first-order condition, the optimal advance
production quantity x* that is to be produced in the
first period can be shown to be:
xg ¼ F1
e c
e s
 
: ð22Þ
Observe that the advance production quantity xg
given in Equation (22) is identical to the optimal ini-
tial order quantity xc given in Equation (3) under the
centralized case. By substituting xg in Equation (21),
we can write the supplier’s optimal profit under the
delegation contract as:
Pgs;1ðhÞ ¼ðhr cÞEðDÞ  ðe cÞE½D xgþ
 ðc sÞE½xg Dþ:
ð23Þ
By using the fact that PgmðhÞ ¼ ðp  hrÞEðDÞ, we
can show that the total supply chain profit under
the delegation contract is:
Pgs;1ðhÞ þPgmðhÞ ¼ðp cÞEðDÞ  ðe cÞE½D xgþ
 ðc sÞE½xg Dþ:
Then, because xg ¼ xc , we have Pgs;1ðhÞ þ PgmðhÞ
¼ Pc, where Πc is the optimal centrally controlled
supply chain profit that is given in Equation (4).
Therefore, we conclude that the delegation contract
coordinates the supply chain.
6.2. Discount Factor
In this section, we examine the existence of a discount
factor h that can facilitate a discount contract with
delegation to coordinate the supply chain. The crux of
the discount factor selection hinges on the following
two factors. First, observe from Equation (22) that xg
is independent of the discount factor h. This indicates
that the supplier’s profit Pgs;1ðhÞ given in Equation
(23) is linearly increasing in h and the supplier will
not be worse off as long as Pgs;1ðhÞ  ðr  eÞEðDÞ. Sec-
ond, observe that the manufacturer’s profit
PgmðhÞ ¼ ðp  hrÞEðDÞ is linearly decreasing in h.
Hence, the manufacturer will be better off if h < 1.
The above two factors imply that the existence of
such a delegation contract (in combination with
advance order discount) hinges on the existence of a
nonempty region that satisfies these two conditions:
(a) h < 1 (i.e., manufacturer’s participation con-
straint), and (b) h ≥ h (i.e., supplier’s participation
constraint), where h is derived from the condition
Pgs;1ðhÞ  ðr  eÞEðDÞ as follows:
ðhr cÞEðDÞ  ðe cÞE½D xgþ  ðc sÞE½xg Dþ
 ðr eÞEðDÞ
) h 1
rEðDÞ
h
ðr eþ cÞEðDÞ þ ðe cÞE½D xgþ
þ ðc sÞE½xg Dþ
i
 h:
ð24Þ
Hence, any delegation contract h that has h 2 [h, 1)
will ensure the supplier is not worse off and make
the manufacturer strictly better off under the dis-
count contract with delegation. Therefore, a delega-
tion contract that coordinates the decentralized
supply chain and is Pareto-improving is possible
if, and only if, h < 1. Proposition 2 provides the
necessary and sufficient for such a delegation con-
tract to exist when the demand is normally dis-
tributed.
PROPOSITION 4. Let D  N(l, r2). Then h < 1 if and
only if rl \
UðkÞ
/ðkÞ, where k ¼ U1ðe ce sÞ.
Proposition 4 provides the necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of a Pareto-improving del-
egation contract that can coordinate the supply chain.
This condition depends on the magnitude of the
demand uncertainty (measured in terms of the coeffi-
cient of variation, rl). A delegation contract exists only
when the demand uncertainty is below a certain
threshold that depends on the underlying cost param-
eters e, c, and s. Thus, when the demand uncertainty
is sufficiently low, the discount contract with delega-
tion is favorable to both the supplier and the manu-
facturer, who delegates the ordering and salvage
decisions to the supplier and benefits from a lower
price hr.
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Proposition 4 has other implications as well. Specif-
ically, when the stated condition holds, such a Pareto-
improving delegation contract is not unique; any
delegation contract with h 2 [h, 1) can ensure the sup-
plier is not worse off (i.e., Pgs;1ðhÞ  ðr  eÞl) and the
manufacturer is strictly better off. In the light of this
observation and our discussion hitherto, we conclude
the following. First, if the delegation contract is pro-
posed by the supplier, then the supplier will propose
the highest discount factor h that is as close to 1 as
possible so that the manufacturer is strictly better off
and the supplier is substantially better off (because
Pgs;1ðhÞ given in Equation (23) is linearly increasing in
h). Second, if the delegation contract is proposed by
the manufacturer, then the manufacturer will propose
the lowest discount factor h = h so that the supplier is
not worse off and yet the manufacturer is consider-
ably better off (because the manufacturer’s profit
PgmðhÞ ¼ ðp  hrÞEðDÞ is linearly decreasing in h). In
practice, the implementation of this form of delega-
tion contract involves negotiations between the
supplier and the manufacturer, and the actual value
of h 2 [h, 1) that is agreed upon would depend on
many factors including the bargaining power of each
party.
7. Optimal Advance-Order Discount
Contract with Two Manufacturers
In this section, we extend our model to analyze the
advance-order discount contract when there is more
than one manufacturer. We consider a model with
two manufacturers who simultaneously source from
a single supplier. It is well known that manufacturers
compete for supplier’s capacity by strategically inflat-
ing their orders to game the rationing policy that the
supplier adopts when capacity is finite (see Cachon
and Lariviere 1999, Cho and Tang 2014, Lee et al.
1997, and the references therein). Even in a single-per-
iod setting, the analysis for finding an efficient alloca-
tion rule Ai(x1, x2), i = {1, 2}, that allocates the
supplier’s capacity between the manufacturers, for a
given order quantities xi, i = {1, 2}, they place, is
complicated. For the optimal advance-order discount
contract in a two-period problem, the supplier’s deci-
sions include the discounts di and the capacity alloca-
tions Atiðx1; x2Þ, for i = {1, 2} and t = {1, 2}. On the
other hand, the decisions of manufacturer i include
the advance-order quantity xi and the second-
period order-up-to quantity yi, i = {1, 2}. Thus, the
two-stage game with three players consists of 10 deci-
sions (6 for supplier and 2 for each manufacturer),
rendering it intractable. Moreover, because our focus
in this study is on the advance-order discount con-
tracts, minimum-order quantity, delegation, and on
designing an efficient combined contract to
coordinate the supply chain in a Pareto-improving
manner, we defer the inclusion of capacity constraints
and the analysis of the potential allocation rules to
future research.
Though we do not analyze the generic case of the
two-period game with finite supplier capacity in
each of the periods, we examine a specific setting in
which the supplier has a finite capacity K in the first
period, but unlimited capacity in the second period.
Also, the manufacturers pay a discounted price for
all the units that are ordered in advance. Note that
we do not restrict the sum of the advance orders
from the two manufacturers to be less than K. We
show that:
• The advance-order discount contract cannot
coordinate the supply chain.
• When advance-order discount di is combined
with minimum order quantity ~qi for each man-
ufacturer i 2 {1, 2}, the combined contract can
coordinate the supply chain.
• The coordinating delegation contract exists if
and only if the coefficients of variation of the
demands of the manufacturers are small
(specifically, we require r1 þr2l1 þl2 to be below a
threshold, where ri and li are the standard
deviation and mean of the demands of manu-
facturer i 2 {1, 2}, respectively).
For a detailed analysis of the two-manufacturer
case, we refer to Chintapalli et al. (2017).
8. Conclusions and Future Directions
In this study, we have examined three supply chain
contracts that are applicable in the context when the
supplier can afford to offer advance-order discounts
to its manufacturer, who places its order before the
uncertain demand is realized. We showed that the
optimal advance-order discount contract is Pareto-
improving, but it can never coordinate the supply
chain because of efficiency loss from decentralization.
This finding led us to examine whether the supplier
can leverage the advance-order discount contract to
design a mechanism that can coordinate the supply
chain. We found that if the supplier offers a combined
contract that is based on the advance-order discount
and a minimum advance-order quantity, then such a
contract can coordinate the supply chain. More
importantly, the supplier can achieve the first-best
solution by extracting the entire surplus from the
manufacturer.
Finally, we considered another contract that could
be proposed by the manufacturer or the supplier
where, in exchange to a discount h on all the items pro-
cured from the supplier, the manufacturer delegates its
ordering decisions and the salvaging activities to the
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supplier. We found that, under some mild conditions
on the demand distribution, the delegation contract
can coordinate the supply chain and that the total
profit could be arbitrarily (within a range) apportioned
between the manufacturer and the supplier. We
showed that the combined advance-order discount
and minimum order quantity contract that coordinates
a supply chain always exists and we derived a neces-
sary and sufficient condition for a combined advance-
order discount and delegation contract to exist. We
found that our results continue to hold in the case
when there are two manufacturers, and when the sup-
plier has limited capacity K in the first period and
unlimited capacity in the second period.
The model presented in this study has several limi-
tations that can serve as potential directions of future
research. First, in our model we assume that the
demand is fully realized in the second period (i.e., the
manufacturer receives firm orders from its retailers).
However, there may be practical cases when the
demand uncertainty is not fully resolved. Even
though the same solution procedure applies, it is of
interest to extend our analysis to the case of demand
updating over multiple time periods and explore the
nature of contracts over the sale horizon. Second, our
model did not capture supplier’s capacity constraints
in both periods. When the supplier has limited capac-
ity in both periods, the strategic interaction between
the supplier and the manufacturer becomes quite
intricate. Specifically, it is of interest to explore the
impact of supplier’s capacity on the supplier’s deci-
sions regarding the advance-order discount factor,
the minimum order quantity, capacity rationing pol-
icy and the like. For instance, when the supplier’s
capacity is limited, manufacturers may anticipate
capacity rationing and hence inflate their orders (see
Cho and Tang 2014 and the references therein) mak-
ing the analysis substantially more complex. We shall
defer these issues to future research.
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Notes
1While the retailer-specific packaging materials can be
inventoried before the selling season, these materials have
only recycling value after the selling season especially
when the packaging design changes every year or when
the manufacturer may not win the contract in the follow-
ing year.
2We are also aware of a case in the commemorative medal
industry. Here, the manufacturer makes medals to cele-
brate special events (sporting events, royal weddings, spe-
cial anniversaries etc.). The commemorative medals are
made out of high value metals (gold, silver, platinum etc.)
and are sold through retailers such as Harrods, The Post
Office and the company’s own Web-site. After receiving
the orders from the retailers, the medals are manufactured
in a single production run. The medals are sold in presen-
tation boxes, often hand-crafted from mahogany or walnut
by a supplier. This case also fits our modeling assump-
tions.
3We note that minimum order quantities are almost
always imposed by packaging suppliers posted on http://
www.alibaba.com.
4This setting is plausible when the supplier is in a better
position to salvage or recycle the leftover packaging mate-
rials.
5We thank an anonymous reviewer who brought this
study to our attention.
6As noted in Cachon (2004) and Lariviere (2006), IGFR
distributions are fairly general because they include com-
mon distributions like the Uniform, the Normal, the Expo-
nential, the Gamma, and the Weibull distributions.
Furthermore, the IGFR distributions ensure that the sup-
plier’s profit function (in a newsvendor setting) is uni-
modal.
7We use the sub/superscript o to denote the base case.
8Clearly, if the supplier aims to maximize its profit subject
to the manufacturer’s participation constraint, the sup-
plier’s problem in the wholesale contract can be formulated
as: max
r e
PosðrÞ, subject to PomðrÞ  0. (For the ease of exposi-
tion, we scale the value of the manufacturer’s outside
option to zero.) The supplier can extract the entire surplus
from the manufacturer by setting r = p under this setting.
Rather than setting r = p, we assume r, the pre-established
contract price, is an exogenous variable, and focus on the
issue of advance-order discount and other such factors (i.e.,
minimum order quantities and delegations).
9Note that the discount is actually (1  d), but congruent
with the established literature, we refer to d simply as the
discount.
10We later show that it is not optimal for the supplier to
set d 	 cr.
11In many instances, packaging suppliers in the food
industry are often large multi-national companies,
whereas contract food manufacturers are typically smaller
national companies that often focus on specialized niche
items. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the supplier is
the Stackelberg leader.
12We use the sub/superscript c to denote the centralized
case.
13Here we use the sub/superscript d to denote the decen-
tralized case.
14We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting us to
examine whether the combination of over-production and
advance-order discount can coordinate a decentralized
supply chain.
15The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix S1. Note
that Proposition 1 requires access to Lemma 1, which is
also given in Appendix S1.
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16We use the sub/superscript q to denote the advance-
order discount with a minimum order quantity contract.
17Our delegation contract is akin to the vendor managed
inventory (VMI) agreement under which the manufacturer
manages the replenishments on behalf the retailer (e.g.,
see, Aviv and Federgruen 1998, Lee et al. 1997). To exe-
cute this delegation contract, the supplier needs to observe
the realized demand as in most VMI contracts (Cetinkaya
and Lee 2000, Disney and Towill 2003).
18We use the sub/superscript g to denote the delegation
contract.
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